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In 1961, the president of France posed a hard question to the US president: Would the United States really risk its own destruction to protect its allies in Europe from a nuclear strike? The inquiry was rooted in skepticism that the US would ever trade one of its cities for the defense of a partner nation. Not reassured, France had already taken matters into its own hands by conducting its first nuclear weapons test the previous year, thus ensuring a measure of strategic independence.

Today, similar doubts are emerging among America’s closest allies—not because of new capabilities by adversaries, but due to the changing nature of America’s global role and its shifting commitment to alliances. From Seoul and Warsaw to Ottawa and Canberra, the assumption that US nuclear protection is reliable is being reassessed. This is triggering the emergence of what many fear could be a third nuclear age, characterized not by reductions in warheads but by fresh incentives for proliferation, even among long-standing US partners.

Historically, the US managed its allies’ nuclear ambitions by offering protection under its own nuclear umbrella. This strategy, built during the Cold War, convinced nations to abstain from nuclear development in return for American security guarantees. When countries such as South Korea and Taiwan pursued nuclear ambitions, the US applied enough political and economic pressure to pull them back. The broader strategy culminated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a landmark agreement that became a foundation of global arms control.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of nuclear optimism. The United States and Russia, inheriting vast nuclear arsenals, began reducing their stockpiles through bilateral arms agreements. Global nuclear governance was strengthened with the indefinite extension of the NPT and a global ban on nuclear testing. From the mid-1980s to 2000, the number of warheads globally dropped from over 70,000 to around 12,500—a trend welcomed by much of the international community.

However, that optimism has since eroded. The war in Eastern Europe and the deterioration of East-West relations have brought back open nuclear threats. The expiration of key arms control treaties threatens to remove the last limitations on the arsenals of the two largest nuclear powers. Meanwhile, China is rapidly growing its stockpile and military theorists predict a new three-way arms race between the US, Russia, and China.

This third nuclear age is marked by more than just old rivalries. The nuclear problem today involves not only deterrence but also trust. North Korea is no longer simply a nonproliferation issue; it is a country with demonstrated capabilities, raising complex strategic questions for the US and its allies. In South Asia, tensions between India and Pakistan continue to rise, with both countries now established nuclear powers. Adding to this volatile mix, new technologies such as cyber weapons and artificial intelligence raise fears of miscalculations or new forms of nuclear escalation.

Amid these changes, allies in Europe and Asia are feeling increasingly vulnerable. Questions about whether the United States would honor its defense commitments are no longer theoretical. Shifting political rhetoric, especially recent comments from top US officials downplaying commitments to collective defense, has rattled nerves across allied capitals. The impression has taken hold that America may be rethinking its role as the ultimate guarantor of allied security.

Campaign statements encouraging countries like Japan and South Korea to pursue their own nuclear weapons, as well as earlier decisions to withdraw from international nuclear agreements, have further undermined confidence. These contradictions—on one hand warning against proliferation while on the other signaling possible abandonment—create a deeply unstable dynamic.

The result may be a future where countries that have long benefited from American protection consider building their own arsenals. Nations like Germany, Poland, South Korea, and Japan might not be close to crossing the nuclear threshold yet, but the political groundwork is being laid. If such decisions were made, it would upend the current balance of power and render any meaningful nuclear arms reduction among the major powers nearly impossible.

In many allied countries, the focus is shifting from reassurance to action. Without consistent and credible commitments from the US, relying on extended deterrence may seem more like a risk than a safeguard. Recent increases in European defense spending and moves to explore independent deterrence strategies are a sign of this changing reality.

Two European nuclear powers are evaluating how their capabilities might serve a broader role in regional deterrence. If successful, such efforts could prevent wider nuclear proliferation across Europe. But challenges remain significant. Coordination, political will, and investment are required to establish a new architecture of deterrence that does not rely on Washington.

Neither European nuclear power has yet fully prepared for a post-American strategic environment. One maintains more autonomy in its nuclear policy, while the other’s force is more intertwined with American technology and planning. Still, with the right mix of conventional and nuclear enhancements—including investments in precision-strike systems, air defense, and long-range drones—there is a path forward.

What lies ahead is not predetermined. The world may see a new nuclear arms race, or it may forge a more balanced, multilateral system of deterrence. The choices made by America and its allies today will determine which future unfolds. A more dangerous world can still be avoided—but only if the global community is prepared to act with urgency, clarity, and resolve in confronting the nuclear challenges of the 21st century.